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Corporate governance structure, Bank 
externalities and sensitivity of non-performing 
loans in Nigeria
Alex Adegboye1*, Stephen Ojeka1 and Kofo Adegboye2
Abstract:  This study highlights the effect of corporate governance structure and 
bank externalities on non-performing loans in Nigeria covering the period 
2009–2017. This study constructs corporate governance index for Nigerian Banks 
using Principal Component Analysis to establish the influence of corporate gov-
ernance structure on non-performing loans. This study conducts a panel data 
analysis using static and dynamic estimators to examine the sensitivity of non- 
performing loans and corporate governance structure. From the empirical ana-
lysis, corporate governance structure of banks in Nigeria has a negative and 
significant influence on non-performing loans in Nigerian banks. This result 
reveals that sound corporate governance structure enhances the loan quality 
and bank stability. In addition, the study affirms that stringent policy imposed by 
the bank regulators has a negative impact on non-performing loans. Thus, 
effective corporate governance mechanism and bank regulations could help to 
curb excessive risk appetite that could mutilate probable performance and loan 
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quality. This study recommends that banks should continue to implement high 
quality of corporate governance mechanism with positive effects at eliminating 
excessive risk-taking.
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Keywords: corporate governance index; non-performing loans; principal component 
analysis; bank externalities
1. Introduction
The stability of every economy depends on the safety and soundness of its financial institutions. 
The financial institution especially banks in this context serves as an intermediary between the 
economy’s surplus and deficit players of the economy with positive effects on economic growth 
and development. The industry as financial intermediary channels the wealth stored by the 
depositors to the borrowers as a predictable source of loans (Isaac, 2014). Thus, a country’s 
financial stability and sustainable economic development thrive on an efficient flow of investment. 
However, financial institutions face multiple financial risks such as credit risk, interest rate risk and 
counterparty risks. Many financial institutions focus primarily on a persistent increase in rates of 
return by employing diverse financial & physical instruments and venture into risky lending 
exercise without adequate risk assessment impairing financial stability (Zagorchev & Gao, 2016).
Nigerian financial sectors experienced financial crisis following the 2008 global economic crisis and 
this event contributed to the undercapitalization of Nigerian banks. The global crisis affected many 
world-renowned financial institutions, which eventually led to the meltdown of economies like the 
United States of America. In Nigeria, approximately 70% of the stock value was lost in the stock market. 
Prior studies identified that corporate governance was the principal contributor to the event coupled 
with other factors such as instability of macro-economic indicators, lack of shareholders’ activism, 
inadequate disclosure and transparency of financial position of banks, negligent risk management, 
unstructured governance of Central Bank of Nigeria, and weaknesses in the business environment 
(Adegbite, 2015a; Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018). Necessary reform programmes were implemented to 
stabilize the banking system. Among others, Central Bank of Nigeria injected N620 billions of liquidities to 
rescue the affected banks and had to replace directors of eight (8) banks to restore the stakeholders’ 
confidence (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2010). The Nigeria banking system continuously seeks to circumvent 
any perpetual event that may lead to a concurrent financial crisis. Hence, any negative signal in the 
sector always triggers concerns of both the regulators and the stakeholders.
The level of non-performing loan seemingly reflects the health of the financial sector, which 
implies that a higher percentage of non-performing loan indicates difficulty in the collection of 
interest and principal on loans by banks. The recent increase in non-performing loans has sped the 
concerns of the stakeholders. In 2009, the non-performing loans were approximately 37% of all 
loan in Nigerian banks. This dropped to 2.97% in 2014 after interventions of the regulators (Central 
bank of Nigeria, 2015). Recently, a survey by Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) 
disclosed that the non-performing loan is approaching 20% as of December 2017 against the 
5% regulatory threshold. A financial stress test, which examined twenty (20) banks and four (4) 
merchant banks to assess credit, liquidity, interest rate and contagion risks resilience of banks, also 
revealed that only large banks would survive if nonperforming loan should rise by 50% (Central 
Bank of Nigeria, 2017). International Monetary Fund (2018) expressed its concern about some 
lower-middle-income countries including Nigeria experiencing deteriorated loan as growth has 
debilitated and corporate financial positions have deteriorated quality in recent years. These 
recent trends in bad loans have provoked some concerns and questions among stakeholders, 
which include; why are the figures rising? What are the implications? What role has internal abuse 
played in all these? What are the actions of the regulators? Is the Nigerian financial sector heading 
towards another financial crisis?
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Non-performing loan is a significant factor used by regulators to determine financial stability 
and bank asset quality. Non-performing loans have contributed largely to prior bank failure and 
envisaged an indicator of the banking crisis (Us, 2017). Increase in non-performing loans signifies 
the unascertained banking crisis (Louzis et al., 2012). In addition, increased nonperforming loans 
relate to weaknesses in the financial system, which exposes the bank’s vulnerability to credit risk. 
This has drawn the attention of several studies to explore the determinants of banks’ asset quality 
such as bank-specific and macroeconomic factors in developing and developed economies (Abid 
et al., 2014; Dimitrios et al., 2016; Ghosh, 2015; Louzis et al., 2012; Maharmah & Saadeh, 2015; 
Wairimu & Gitundu, 2017).
Since the recent global financial crisis, corporate governance has extensively received unusual 
consideration especially in the banking industry. Proactively, studies have begun to explore how 
corporate governance affects banks’ loan quality in developed countries. Evidence reveals that 
ineffective corporate governance structure fails to recognize and prevent the excessive risk appe-
tites, which lead to the vulnerable financial practice (Grove et al., 2011; Tarchouna et al., 2017a). 
However, a strand of literature in developing countries has identified non-performing loans as one 
of the causative factors to bank failure but literature on the effect of corporate governance on 
non-performing loans languishes especially in Nigeria. This study intends to bridge this knowledge 
gap. Based on this, this study attempts to extend the existing body of literature in developing 
economies by exploring the influence of corporate governance mechanisms, bank externalities 
and non-performing loans in Nigeria.
Overall, this study contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, the study builds an 
index that captures the overall corporate governance structure in Nigeria, which sheds light on the 
importance of sound corporate governance structure in the enhancement of loan quality in 
developing countries. Second, the study also examines the sensitivity of loan quality to regulations 
imposed by the regulators, which extends the direct contributions of bank regulations on non-
performing loans. Third, the adopted diverse methodological specifications for banks provide 
robust results and expand the strand of the corporate governance literature. Four, this study 
explores the risk appetite of banks aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis period to shed light on 
the resultant effect of the implementation of corporate governance and regulations imposed by 
the regulators.
The remainder of this paper is divided into the following section: Section 2 deals with the 
theoretical framework underpinning the study and the literature reviews. Section 3 discusses the 
research design and methodology. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics and empirical analysis. 
Section 5 makes the final conclusions and suggestions.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Theoretical Framework
Corporate governance literature across countries has been entrenched within the agency theory. 
The agency relationship involves the engagement of management by the owners to perform 
responsibilities on behalf of the latter, which include delegation of decision-making endeavour 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The theory provides a framework unveiling the possible relationship 
between the principals and agents (Fama, 1980). In addition, the framework posits that share-
holders guarantee that managers protect their interest and maximize their wealth alongside 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The Agency theory argues that managers are custodians of the organi-
zational activities while managing the business in the best interest of the shareholders. From the 
perspective of the agency theory, other stakeholders are irrelevant. This means that they are not 
entitled to any benefits from the corporation as it tends to contradict the best interest of the 
shareholders. Ignoring the interest of the stakeholders has been questioned with the argument 
that business cannot operate in a vacuum. Equally, the stakeholder theory argues that every 
stakeholder deserves some portion of returns generated by the organization. The theory posits 
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that management should operate the business in a way that is advantageous to all stakeholders 
while all returns are shared suitably on an acceptable basis. Unfortunately, the acceptable prora-
tion mechanism is lacking, which frustrates the proposition of stakeholder theory (Del Briano- 
Turrent & Rodríguez-Ariza, 2016).
Although the principal-agent framework proposes ways by which shareholders can protect their 
interest and maximizing their wealth through adopting mechanisms for sound corporate govern-
ance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), the theory is built on Anglo-Saxon markets, which tends to limit 
both academic and structural approach to corporate governance globally (Learmount, 2003). For 
instance, prior empirical studies posit that substantial misalignment tends to transpire when the 
normative mechanism of sound corporate governance is adopted across countries (Chang, 1992; 
Demirag et al., 2000; Hove, 1986). In addition, the principal-agency conflict is dealt with in different 
approaches across countries (Adegbite, 2015b). Thus, agency theory fails to completely account for 
jurisdiction differences in its operationalization. Furthermore, agency and stakeholder theory 
assumes strong efficient and competitive markets in its operationalization, minimal information 
asymmetry and strong stakeholders’ activism (Udayasankar et al., 2005). This proposition tends to 
be invalid in most developing countries like Nigeria. For instance, the advancement of Nigerian 
corporate governance is characterized by the establishing families and friends who recurrently 
retain control on the board and manage activities (Nakpodia & Adegbite, 2018).
The theoretical basis of this research is based on the Institutional Theory, which compliments 
agency and stakeholder theory. Scott (2004) suggests that institutional theory avers the resilient 
characteristics of the socio-cultural structure and accounts for the establishment of organizational 
values, standards and rules consistent with an acceptable guiding principle for corporate conduct. 
The corporation reflects the rationalized instructional norms that organization imbibe within the 
jurisdiction (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). From the intuitionists approach, they emphasize on the 
complication of corporate governance practices across countries peculiarities (Boehmer, 1999). 
The peculiarities are dominant when dealing with the comparison between strong and weak 
institutions such as Nigeria (Adegbite, 2015b). The World Bank Report on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC) validates that corporate governance practice in Nigeria is plagued 
with institutional weaknesses considering aspects such as rule, compliance and implementation 
capacities (ROSC, 2004).
2.2. Corporate Governance and Non-performing Loans
It is expected that well-governed banks have lower non-performing loans. There exist several 
reasons to expect well-governed bank to be more efficient in their operations and enhanced loan 
quality. Love and Rachinsky (2015) suggest that this proposition could be traced to: (1) limited 
amount of related-parties and self-dealing transactions (2) lower cost of capital exhibited by well- 
governed banks and (3) more efficient operations by better-governed banks. On the premise of 
extremely weak institutions, the benefits accruing from voluntary adoption of corporate govern-
ance “best practices” could be minimal since the provisions are deemed not to be enforceable. 
Well-functioning corporate governance could mirror the rule of law and the regulatory environ-
ment of the respective countries (Love & Rachinsky, 2015). Thus, a weak regulatory environment 
could render the firm’s best corporate governance practices to be likely ineffective.
Since the recent global financial crisis, corporate governance has received unusual consideration 
especially in the banking industry. Evidence reveals that ineffective corporate governance structure 
fails to recognize and prevent the excessive risk appetites, which lead to the vulnerable financial 
practice (Grove et al., 2011). Taking cognizance of the recent collapse of a financial institution, the 
misconduct illustrates the extent by which the financial systems are vulnerable to systemic risk 
when effective corporate governance targets remain unattainable (Zagorchev & Gao, 2015). Thus, 
regulators have stressed the importance of effective corporate governance in the banking industry 
since the recent failures are traceable to weak corporate governance.
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A strand of literature has examined the determinants of non-performing loans (Love & 
Rachinsky, 2015; Tarchouna et al., 2017b; Zagorchev & Gao, 2015). These studies categorize the 
determinants of NPLs into bank characteristics and macroeconomic indicators. Other empirical 
findings have identified the effect of corporate governance on banks’ loan quality. It is, however, 
noticeable that the majority of the literature is conducted in the developed countries especially the 
United States. Based on this, this study attempts to extend the existing body of literature in 
developing economies by looking at the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and non-performing loans in Nigeria, with evidence from deposit money banks in Nigeria.
2.3. Bank Regulations and Non-performing loans
Bank regulators tend to play a vital role in the banking industry, which could influence the over-
sight functions of the directors and shareholders. Regulator functions can be considered as active 
monitory force, which could handicap the board’s incentive to monitor (Grove et al., 2011). In the 
real sense, regulators tend to act in the best interest of the public and interfere in the banks’ 
activities consequentially complicating corporate governance issues. The Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision introduced a proposed Basel II Capital Accord in January 2001. The proposal 
navigates three pathways in which include an improved requirement for minimum bank capital, 
better supervision practices and more transparent information disclosed by the banks. The 
Committee believes that the adoption of the Best Practices will instigate growth and financial 
stability (Barth et al., 2004).
Theoretically, economic models suggest a conflicting prediction on the effect of bank regulations 
on bank stability and performance. A school of thought supports the proposition that neither 
private and public entities could effectively monitor the activities of complex banks where infor-
mation symmetries tend to exist and the level of power exhibited by the complex bank could 
impair competition, which could harmfully influence policies. Another school of thought believes 
that the effect of information asymmetries is limited and fewer restrictive guidelines enable the 
banks to maximize the economics of scope thus provide more efficient services. In addition, the 
school of thought predicts the conditions where regulations could enhance bank stability and 
performance. Some models suggest that individual countries regulations depend on other institu-
tions and policies (Barth et al., 2004).
Interestingly, empirical evidence has established the possible outcome of bank restrictions on 
banking risk. Boyd et al. (1998) pose that restrictions on bank practices such as minimum capital 
requirement tends to enhance social welfare in countries characterized with liberal deposit insur-
ance. In addition, Klomp and Haan (2015) further emphasize that banking regulations and super-
visory control significantly decrease banking risk. They also establish that the bank restrictions 
tend to reduce risk in the foreign-owned and large bank while the liquidity regulations affect the 
risk of unlisted and commercial banks.
Moreover, the effect of corporate governance structure on performance can be attributable to 
the regulatory environment and the practices of the banking industry (Mülbert, 2010; Ungureanu, 
2008). Regulators could formulate and implement better policies, which could improve banking 
practices and efficiency. In Nigeria, the Central Bank of Nigeria adopted mechanisms such as the 
credit and other monetary circulars, rules, regulation and standards of professional ethics to 
regulate the activities of Nigerian banks (Ajibo, 2015).
3. Methodology
This study examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms and bank externalities on 
non-performing loans in the Nigerian Banking Sector covering the period 2009–2017. The popula-
tion for the study consists of 21 deposit money banks as stated in the Central Bank Nigeria Bulletin 
(Central Bank of Nigeria, 2016). The population is based on the virtue of its risk vulnerability, which 
remains a highly regulated industry unlike non-financial institutions (Klomp & Haan, 2015). 
However, the sample is determined after some filtering criteria. First, firms are discarded from 
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the sample provided desired data are unavailable. Second, only firms with at least five consecutive 
years for all desired data are selected following Thakur and Kannadhasan (2019) to ensure the 
robustness of the study estimation results. With these filtering criteria, only firms with non- 
performing loans are selected to situate the position of this study resulting in 12 banks between 
2009 and 2017.
3.1. Measurement of Variables
To unveil the objective of the study, panel data for the period 2009–2017 were extracted from 
Annual reports, Corporate Websites and Nigeria Stock Exchange Factbook, Central Bank of Nigeria 
Statistical Bulletin and World Development Indicator. The choice of the period is necessitated by 
the fluctuation in the non-performing loans with the year 2009 marking the highest rate of 
nonperforming loans. The study adopts non-performing loans as the dependent variable. 
Independent variables for this study are corporate governance index, bank-specific characteristics 
and macroeconomics indicators identified by prior studies, which could influence the trends of 
non-performing loans.
3.1.1. Non-performing Loans
The dependent variable is proxied by the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans and 
advances. Non-performing loans equal to the total of all past unfulfilled loans as a point of 
time. Although measurements of non-performing loans differ among countries, but this study 
adopts non-performing loans as the total sum of non-accrual loans and other loans due for 
ninety (90) days and above (Ghosh, 2015; Kingu et al., 2018; Mpofu & Nikolaidou, 2018; Pop 
et al., 2018; Radivojevic & Jovovic, 2017). Non-performing loan signifies the financial stability of 
financial institutions, which have a significant influence on the respective economy (Adeola & 
Ikpesu, 2017).
3.1.2. Corporate Governance Index
Extending prior studies on corporate governance (Love & Rachinsky, 2015; Tarchouna et al., 2017b; 
Zagorchev & Gao, 2015), this study employs basically eight relevant corporate governance 
mechanisms with the integration of risk and credit management committee characteristics in 
the construction of the corporate governance index using principal component analysis. Due to 
complexity of banking industry, the risk management mechanisms are implemented to enhance 
sound corporate governance implementation while mitigating excessive risk appetite (Wijaya & 
Atmoko, 2015). Thus, the linear correlation between various corporate governance mechanisms 
can be condensed to a unique corporate governance index, since the mechanisms are implemen-
ted to address the agency problems (Allen et al., 2018; Lakshan & Wijekoon, 2012; Matei & 
Drumasu, 2015; Qian & Yeung, 2015). These eight variables include board magnitude, board 
independence, director ownership, board composition, board engagement, the size of the board 
risk committee, board risk committee meeting and board risk committee independence.
3.1.3. Bank Regulation
Prior studies have identified several variables, which intensify and enhance the bank regulations 
within the sector and the country level (Barth et al., 2004; Boudriga et al., 2010; Laeven & Levine, 
2009; Magar et al., 2008). For instance, Barth et al. (2004) developed an index that proxies bank 
regulations such as capital regulatory index, private monitoring index, official supervisory index, 
banking entry requirement index, restriction on bank activities index and government ownership 
index. For the purpose of this study, we adopt the monetary policy rate in line with the study of 
Faphunda and Eragbhe (2017) and capital adequacy ratio to capture the effectiveness of bank 
regulations in Nigeria. We proxy capital adequacy ratio with the measures of the total bank capital 
to its risk-weighted credit exposure expressed in a percentage.
3.1.4. Firm-specific characteristics
To establish the relationship between the corporate governance structure and non-performing 
loans, we use the bank-specific control variables from prior literature on non-performing loans 
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(Dimitrios et al., 2016; Kauko, 2012; Konstantakis et al., 2016; Louzis et al., 2012; Zagorchev & Gao, 
2016). The control variables include the firm size, return on asset ratio and loan to deposit ratio. To 
unveil the firm’s managerial efficiency to transform its assets and equity into profits, we control 
the return on asset. We also control for the risk preference of the banks by employing the loan to 
deposit ratio. In addition, firm size is proxied by the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets to 
control for correlation between bank size and non-performing loans.
3.1.5. Macroeconomic Factors
In addition, we include the macroeconomic indicators of Nigeria to control for the economic condition, 
which possibly influence the trends of non-performing loans. We adopt three macroeconomic vari-
ables in this study such as inflation rate, lending rate and the real gross domestic product. The inflation 
rate reveals the macroeconomic instability level and lending rate measure the volatility of interest paid 
while gross domestic product growth rate measures economic growth in the country.
3.2. Model Specification
To achieve the objectives of the study, we first adopt the static panel data estimators such as the 
ordinary least square, fixed and random effect while Hausman test is used to select the more 
appropriate estimator. Then we use the system generalized method of moment to evaluate the 
influence of corporate governance structure on non-performing loans for robustness purposes.
The model is firstly expressed in its implicit form: 
yit ¼ β1 þ Xit β2 þ εit (1) 
Where: yit is the dependent variable, Xit is the explanatory variable and it is the error term. Furthermore, 
the model expressed in explicit form as follows: 
NPLit ¼ β0 þ β1CGIit þ β2∑REGit þ β3∑Firmspecificit þ β4∑Macroit þ εit (2) 
εit= Error term, t = year and i = firm
All variables are appropriately defined in Table 1.
Table 1. Definition of variables
Variables Acronym Measurement
Non-performing Loan NPL The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans and 
advances
Corporate Governance Index CGI Computed using Principle Component Principle based on 
Code of Governance by Central Bank of Nigeria
Firm Regulation Indicators REG ● Cash Reserve Ratio
● Monetary Policy Rate
Firm-specific Firmspecific ● Firm size: natural logarithm of firm total assets
● Loan to Deposit Ratio
Macroeconomic 
Indicators
Macro ● Inflation rate of Nigeria
● Lending rate
Board size Bsize Number of people on the board of the firm
Board Risk Committee BRs Number of people on the board risk committee
Board Credit Committee BCs Number of people on the board credit committee
Board Audit Committee Audit Dichotomous variable that equals one (1) where the board 
audit committee is established and zero (0) where otherwise
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Table 2 reports the results of the descriptive statistics of each variable adopted to unveil the 
objectives of this study. This includes the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum value and 
maximum value of each variable. Note: Note: BM is the board magnitude defined as the total 
number of existing board members. BIN is the board independence measured by the ratio of an 
independent director to total members on the board. DOH is the Director ownership calculated as 
Percentage of the number of shares held by directors to total shares. BC is board composition 
measured as the ratio of non-executive directors to total board members and BE is the board 
engagement measured by the number of meetings held yearly for board engagement. The risk 
management characteristics include: Board Risk Committee Size (BRCS) is total number of person-
nel on the committee, Board Risk Committee Meeting (BRCM) measured by total number of the 
committee meeting yearly and Board Risk Committee Independent (BRCI) measured as the ratio 
of independent member to the total member on the committee. NPL is the ratio of non-performing 
loans to gross loans and advances. ROA is Total Profit after Tax/Total Asset. LDR is the year-end 
changes in the Consumer Price Index. MPR is the Monetary Policy Rate. CAR is the Bank Capital 
Adequacy Ratio. IR is the year-end changes in the Consumer Price Index. LR is the yearly nominal 
lending rate. GDP is the real GDP growth rate in Nigeria. In addition, CGI is the Corporate 
Governance Index developed using Principal Component Analysis. REG is Bank Regulations. 
Firmspecific is the Bank-specific characteristics and Macro is the macroeconomic characteristics.
4. Empirical Analysis and Discussion of Results
4.1. Corporate Governance Index
This study adopted the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to build a corporate governance index, 
which assesses the inclusive corporate governance mechanism of selected banks in Nigeria. The 
motive of adopting this method is to control the degree of data dimensionality by altering highly 
correlated data into condensed uncorrelated variables, usually called principal components, thereby 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics summary
VariableN Mean Standard 
Deviation
Min Max
Corporate Governance Mechanisms 14.602 3.261 6 20
BM 108
BIN 108 .107 .076 0 .333
DOH 108 .081 .114 0 .429
BC 108 .656 .107 .5 .917
BE 108 6.315 2.22 2 12
BRCS 108 7.13 2.304 0 14
BRCM 108 3.87 1.177 0 8
BRCI 108 .132 .128 0 .5
Bank Specific Factors 
NPL
108 .083 .104 .009 .69
ROA 108 .013 .04 −.241 .061
LDR 108 .632 .184 .015 1.004
Firm Size 108 20.927 .812 18.68 22.445
Economic Factors 
IR
108 .118 .029 .081 .165
LR 108 .17 .007 .16 .184
GDP 108 .047 .037 −.016 .113
Regulation Factor 
CAR
108 .194 .119 −.636 .44
MPR 108 .108 .031 .06 .14
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retains the high variability in the set of data (Larcker et al., 2007). The arrangement of principal 
components allows the first components to explain the most variability in the dataset, while the 
consecutive components predict the less variability compared to the previous set (Jolliffe, 2002).
The principal component analysis is meant to build a corporate governance index for Nigerian
Banks. This method transforms available individual firm’s corporate governance mechanisms to 
an aggregate representing the corporate governance structure. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
affirmed that PCA can control for the statistical problem of multicollinearity of various data set 
when regressing simultaneously. The method also produces the weights for the aggregate variable 
automatically.
Interestingly, the principal components analysis condenses eight corporate governance vari-
ables into corporate governance index. We adopt the identified corporate governance attributes to 
construct a corporate governance index for Nigerian Banks. The adopted governance indices 
include Board Magnitude, the ratio of Board Independent, Degree of Director Ownership, Board 
Composition, Board Meeting, Board Risk Committee Size, Board Risk Committee Meeting and Board 
Risk Committee Independence. In the process, the first principal components are selected, which 
represent the existing variability in the dataset in line with the study of Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), 
Florackis and Ozkan (2009a), Tarchouna et al. (2017a).
Panel A of Table 3 presents the correlation between the corporate governance variables used to 
construct the corporate governance index. Relatively, the low and weak correlation coefficients 
between the variables depict that the adopted indices mirror diverse features of the corporate 
governance systems in the selected Nigerian banks.
Panel B reports the principal component loadings for the Index, which is mainly characterized by 
the Board Magnitude and the Board Risk Committee Size, as their absolute loadings exceed 0.5. 
Like Tarchouna et al. (2017a) and Dalton et al. (1999), the positive contribution of Board Magnitude 
to the overall corporate governance structure indicate larger board size enables the firm to access 
expertise skills and available resources to navigate high-risk endeavours.
Based on the result in Table 3, the degree of board ownership contributes positively to the 
overall corporate governance structure. This implies the prominence of directors’ ownership in the 
corporate governance structure in Nigerian Banks. However, the positive weight of director own-
ership predicts that higher degree of incentives might promote effective corporate governance 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). However, the negative contribution of non-executive directors to the 
overall corporate governance structure validates the argument that the dominance of non- 
executive directors might be inefficient (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009b).
Similarly, the size of the board risk committee (BRCS) has a positive weight in the corporate 
governance index of the sampled banks, which implies that the committee has an effective 
influence on the overall index. However, the risk committee meeting (BRCM) has a positive con-
tribution to the built index, which has effective contribution implication. It is also identified that the 
risk committee independence (BRCI) has a negative contribution to the corporate governance 
index, which implies a passive role played by the independent directors on the committee.
Additionally, the principal component analysis further requires two additional statistical tests, 
which include Bartlett’s sphericity and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin tests to validate the instrument 
(Maddala, 2001). The Bartlett’s test with its null hypothesis tests that the correlation matrix is 
not factorable (Pett et al., 2003). For the data used to be appropriate for factor analysis, the 
p-value of Bartlett’s test should be less than 0.05% or 5%. Under this study, the p-value of 
Bartlett’s test reports
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0.000 in which the null hypothesis of the non-factorable correlation matrix is rejected. This 
implies that this finding reflects the linear relationship between the adopted corporate 
governance indices. Furthermore, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin “K MO” takes a value between 0 and 
1, with 0.50 being acceptable as a critical threshold (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009b) for sampling 
adequacy. It is noted that the KMO value is 0.522, which reflects acceptable sampling 
adequacy. This finding indicates that the built index represents the eleven corporate govern-
ance indices wholly (Stewart, 1981). Therefore, the two tests confirm the validity of using the 
principal component analysis for the construction of a corporate governance index under this 
study.
4.2. Correlation Analysis
Table 4 reports the correlation analysis with the motive of showing the degree of linear association 
between dependent and independent variables adopted in the research study. The table equally 
presents the result of correlation coefficients with a probability value.
In addition, Table 4 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the independent variables 
adopted in the analysis. The table indicates low correlation among the variables. Hence, there is 
no indication of serious multicollinearity in the models adopted.
4.3. Panel Data Regression Results
Table 5 presents the effect of corporate governance structure and bank regulations on 
Nonperforming Loans while introducing Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM) to test for 
the level of sensitivity of Non-performing Loans. The Hausman Test validates the use of 
Random Effect for appropriate analysis at Prob>chi2 = 0.8154. In addition, it is vital to examine 
the preliminary level of goodness of fit of the overall model and the strength of the explana-
tory power of the regressors. From Table 5, the R2 reports that 60.2% of the independent 
variables explain the level of non-performing loans. This explanatory power of the regressors is 
statistically significant by the p-value of F statistics at 1% of significant level, which enhanced 
the model’s reliability and validity.
From the reports presented in Table 5, the coefficient of corporate governance index is negative 
and significant at 5% level of significance except for the result presented by the Generalized 
Method of Moment, which indicates insignificance. This implies that Banks with better corporate 
governance system could effectively reduce the level of non-performing loans. This result reflects 
a corporate governance system capable of reducing the level of non-performing loans in the 
banks. This further explains effective loans evaluations by the corporate governance system to 
limit default loans, which could impair loan quality and performance. Nigerian Banks have under-
taken diverse reforms since the 2008/2009 financial crisis due to excess default loans. Therefore, 
the result of this study has confirmed that the reformed corporate governance has nevertheless 
strengthened the Banks decisions as regards excessive risk-taking. This finding corroborates with 
the findings of Zagorchev and Gao (2015) in United States Banking Sectors, Love and Rachinsky 
(2015) in banking sector of Russian and Tarchouna et al. (2017a) among the small banks in the 
United States. However, these findings are at variance with the findings of Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012), which examined the status of corporate governance of United States banking sector during 
the global financial crisis, Erkens et al. (2012) who survey the corporate governance in 2007 and 
2008 financial crisis from global perspective and Tarchouna et al. (2017a) findings, which suggest 
positive influence of corporate governance system on non-performing loans in both medium and 
large banks in United States.
Likewise, bank regulation indicator is applied to examine their impact on the level of nonper-
forming loans. Although Monetary Policy Rate is significant for the Fixed Effect and Generalized 
Method of Moment, the relationship remains negative. This implies that the increase in Monetary 
Policy Rate leads to decrease in Non-performing Loans. This implies that the tight monetary policy 
rate could reduce the supply of bank loans, which in turn affects the borrowers to access adequate 
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loans. In addition, a regulatory restriction could discourage friendly banks’ loan terms with the 
borrowers to access loans. Monetary policy rate tends to affect financial institutions directly as its 
reserves and interest rate are adjusted, which could affect the demand for credit. This is consistent 
with the findings of Boudriga et al. (2010), and Barth et al. (2004).
Table 5. Regression Analysis of Non-performing Loans as explained variable
Variables Ordinary Least 
Square





Index −0.0210*** −0.0313*** −0.0260*** −0.00342
(0.00641) (0.00849) (0.00721) (0.00580)
Bank Regulation
MPR −0.416 −1.184** −0.578 −0.436*
(0.422) (0.551) (0.418) (0.251)
CAR −0.169** −0.193** −0.178** −0.176
(0.0744) (0.0790) (0.0749) (0.108)
Controlling Variables
Firm Size 0.000943 0.0486 0.00540 0.0115
(0.00888) (0.0331) (0.0126) (0.00780)
ROA −1.084*** −0.748*** −0.950*** 0.287
(0.239) (0.267) (0.245) (0.428)
LDR −0.0986*** −0.106** −0.105*** −0.0179
(0.0373) (0.0418) (0.0387) (0.0248)
GDP 0.394 0.287 0.326 −0.214
(0.367) (0.349) (0.347) (0.264)
IR 0.889*** 0.813*** 0.864*** −0.0276
(0.296) (0.279) (0.277) (0.185)
LR 2.593** 2.943** 2.735** 4.648***
(1.275) (1.213) (1.201) (1.602)
Constant −0.348 −1.303* −0.438 −0.899***
(0.265) (0.693) (0.313) (0.315)
Observations 108 108 108 96
R-squared 0.671 0.670 0.602
F-test 22.19 19.62
Prob > F 0 0
Wald chi2 193.1




AR (1) _test −2.067
AR (1) _P-value 0.0388
AR (2) _test 1.043
AR (2) _P-value 0.297
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
Adegboye et al., Cogent Economics & Finance (2020), 8: 1816611                                                                                                                                    
https://doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2020.1816611                                                                                                                                                       
Page 13 of 21
Similarly, the capital adequacy ratio coefficient shows a negative and statistically significant at 5% 
relationship with non-performing loans. This infers that well-capitalized and diversified financial 
institutions whose capacity can resist potential credit default. The negative link between the capital 
adequacy ratio and non-performing loans could be attributable to the level of sensitivity of banks to 
credit risk and the strict regulations of the Central Bank of Nigeria. Therefore, higher capitalized banks 
are less susceptible to aggressive risk taking. This result agrees with the findings of Djiogap and Ngomsi 
(2012) for Central African Economic and Monetary Community, Zhang et al. (2016) for Chinese 
commercial banking system. However, the finding contravenes with the study of EL-Maude et al. 
(2017), Radivojevic and Jovovic (2017), Tomak (2013), Badar and Yasmin (2013), Konfi (2012).
4.3.1. Additional Analysis Results
Table 6 presents the result for the effect on corporate governance variables on the non-performing 
loans. Ultimately, it is necessary to disaggregate and identify the individual effect of the corporate 
governance construct on the non-performing loans in Nigerian Banks. However, the Hausman Test 
validates the use of Random Effect for appropriate analysis. In addition, it is vital to examine the 
preliminary level of goodness of fit of the overall model and the strength of the explanatory power of 
the regressors. From Table 11, the R2 reports that 30.4% of the independent variables explain the level 
of non-performing loans. This explanatory power of the regressors is statistically significant by the 
p-value of F statistics at 1% of significant level, which enhanced the model’s reliability and validity.
From Table 6, all the coefficient of variables except for the independent directors and board 
meeting are negative and insignificant. The Board Magnitude has a negative influence on non-
performing loans. This implies that large board size tends to ensure a lower level of nonperforming 
loans as the magnitude would provide expertise skills and reduce the board risk appetite. 
Conversely, the level of its influence remains statistically insignificant, which can be attributed to 
ineffectiveness to reduce non-performing loans. In addition, there is an inverse relationship 
between the degree of non-executive directors on the board and the non-performing loans. The 
dominance of non-executive directors tends to eliminate the high level of nonperforming loans as 
they are characterized to be risk-averse. However, the relationship is statistically insignificant, 
which could imply a lack of requisite skills and information characterized by non-executive direc-
tors to actively engage in confrontational monitory role (Florackis & Ozkan, 2009a). However, only 
the board meeting is positive and significant at 5% level of significance. This implies that the board 
interaction and activities have neglected the negative potential of default loans in Nigerian Banks.
Similarly, the number of independent directors on the Board Risk Committee has an inverse 
relationship with non-performing loans. This indicates the degree at which independent directors 
influence the level of risk appetite on default credit risk. Nonetheless, their influence is statistically 
insignificant, which implies ineffectiveness. Similarly, the Board Risk Committee Size has a negative 
influence on non-performing loans. This denotes that large board risk committee limits the level of 
the risk appetite of the board by reducing the extent of non-performing loans in selected firms.
4.3.2. Bank Externalities Effect and Non-performing Loans
Table 7 presents the result of the bank-specific and the macroeconomic determinants of nonperforming 
loans in Nigerian Financial Institutions. This examines the specific determinants of Non-performing 
Loans exempting the contribution of the corporate governance system. As shown in Table 7, the 
Hausman Test validates the use of Random Effect for appropriate analysis. In addition, it is vital to 
examine the preliminary level of goodness of fit of the overall model and the strength of the explanatory 
power of the regressors. From Table 7, the R2 reports that 62.7% of the independent variables explain 
the level of non-performing loans. This explanatory power of the regressors is statistically significant by 
the p-value of F statistics at 1% of significant level, which enhanced the model’s reliability and validity.
Furthermore, the return on asset (ROA) coefficient reflects a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with non-performing loans. This implies that the Banks in Nigeria 
engage in less risky activities that could deteriorate loan quality and firm performance. In 
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addition, more profitable financial institutions have less tendency of default loans and fewer 
incentives to absorb in excessive risk activities. This finding is consistent with prior studies such 
as Zagorchev and Gao (2015), Dimitrios et al. (2016), (Ghosh, 2015), Messai and Jouini (2013), & 
Klein (2013). In addition, “bad management” hypothesis of Berger and DeYoung (1997) sug-
gests that profitability negatively impact non-performing loans in which this study is consistent 
with. Nonetheless, the study of Gesu (2014), Makri et al. (2014) and Ahmed and Bashir (2013) 
find a positive and statistically significant relationship between return on asset and non- 
performing loans.
Likewise, the coefficient of loan to customers’ deposit ratio (LDR) indicates a negative and 
statistically significant at 1% significant level relationship with non-performing loans. An increased 
loan to deposits ratio unveils the degree of firm risk preference, which could lead to higher default 
Table 6. Decomposition of corporate governance and non-performing loans
Variables Ordinary Least 
Square
Fixed Effect Random Effect
Corporate Governance 
Measures
BS −0.00899** −0.00646 −0.00693
(0.00394) (0.00493) (0.00434)
BIN −0.110 0.212 0.0691
(0.181) (0.210) (0.194)
DOH −0.0391 −0.0900 −0.0385
(0.0824) (0.278) (0.139)
BC −0.0938 0.00253 −0.0375
(0.101) (0.109) (0.102)
BE 0.0138*** 0.0107** 0.0125***
(0.00451) (0.00498) (0.00470)
BRCS 0.000900 −0.0153** −0.00877
(0.00505) (0.00704) (0.00604)
BRCM −0.0107 −0.00756 −0.00866
(0.00852) (0.00810) (0.00799)
BRCI −0.0783 −0.0697 −0.0876
(0.0941) (0.117) (0.105)
Control Variables
Size −0.0299** −0.0736*** −0.0473**
(0.0132) (0.0264) (0.0185)
Constant 0.874*** 1.780*** 1.223***
(0.255) (0.556) (0.380)
Observations 108 108 108
R-squared 0.292 0.316 0.304
F-test 4.491 4.461
Prob > F 5.95e-05 7.95e-05
Wald Chi2 37.70
Prob > chi2 1.98e-05
Hausman Test 8.63
Prob>chi2 0.4720
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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loans. However, this finding shows a negative link between LDR and NPL, which could be attributed 
to the firms’ stringent lending policies. This means that a limited amount of customers’ deposits is 
used for loans due to the requirement of the Central Bank of Nigeria. This finding is in conformance 
with the study of Ranjan and Chandra (2003) for commercial banks in India, which on the contrary, 
contravene with the study of Louzis et al. (2012), Swamy (2012) and EL-Maude et al. (2017). In 
summary, Nigerian banks are more conservative in taking excessive risks that could impair the 
firms’ liquidity and sustainability.
The real gross domestic product growth has a relationship with non-performing loans. However, 
the link between the real GDP and non-performing loan remains insignificant. This implies that the 
real GDP growth does not directly improve the borrowers’ debt-servicing capacity. In essence, the 
decline in real GDP could cause borrowers to have challenges in servicing their debts. This finding 
contradicts the theory that postulates economic growth influences the borrowers’ income who in 
turn repay loans. This finding is in conformity with the result of Adeola and Ikpesu (2017), Louzis 
et al. (2012), and Wairimu and Gitundu (2017), which contravene several prior study findings such 
Table 7. Determinants of non-performing loans
Variables Ordinary Least 
Square
Fixed Effect Random Effect
Bank Specific Factors
ROA −1.072*** −0.829*** −1.004***
(0.251) (0.284) (0.258)
LDR −0.0827** −0.111** −0.0956**
(0.0388) (0.0446) (0.0405)
Firm Size −0.00614 0.0506 −0.00290
(0.00903) (0.0354) (0.0122)
Economic Factors
IR 0.844*** 0.769** 0.825***
(0.310) (0.298) (0.296)
LR 2.650* 3.172** 2.821**
(1.336) (1.295) (1.281)
GDP 0.403 0.331 0.359
(0.384) (0.373) (0.369)
Regulatory Factor
MPR −0.295 −1.031* −0.372
(0.441) (0.588) (0.437)
CAR −0.195** −0.224*** −0.203***
(0.0775) (0.0840) (0.0788)
Constant −0.223 −1.387* −0.299
(0.275) (0.741) (0.315)
Observations 108 108 108
R-squared 0.635 0.618 0.627
F-test 21.50 17.82
Prob > F 0 0
chi-squared 162.1
Prob > chi2 0
Hausman Test 3.88
Prob>chi2 0.8681
Standard errors in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
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as Akinlo and Emmanuel (2014), Abid et al. (2014), Dimitrios et al. (2016), and Radivojevic and 
Jovovic (2017).
Similarly, the coefficient of inflation rate (IR) shows a positive and statistically positive relation-
ship with the non-performing loans. This finding infers inflation impairs banks’ loan quality and 
deteriorate the real value of loans. Therefore, the increase in inflation without a corresponding 
increase in borrowers’ income tends to reduce their loan repayment capacity thus, increase non- 
performing loans. This finding is consistent with the prior studies such as Skarica (2014), Ghosh 
(2015), and Louzis et al. (2012), (Abid et al., 2014) Wairimu and Gitundu (2017).
However, the finding contradicts the study of Akinlo and Emmanuel (2014)
Likewise, the lending rate coefficient reflects a positive and statistically significant relationship 
with non-performing loans. This indicates that the increase in lending rate would increase the 
borrowers’ debt value and result in more expensive debt servicing. This finding reflects the level of 
sensitivity of non-performing loans to lending rates. This implies that an increase in lending rate 
tends to weaken the borrowers’ loan repayment capacity, thus increasing the level of nonperform-
ing loans. This finding conforms with the results of Louzis et al. (2012), Akinlo and Emmanuel 
(2014), and Wairimu and Gitundu (2017). In summary, these results suggest that staggering 
economic conditions could impair the ability of borrowers to pay back their loans as at when due.
5. Conclusion
This study is primarily stimulated by the recent increasing trends of non-performing loans and the 
dearth of knowledge on the influence of corporate governance structure on non-performing loans 
in developing countries especially Nigeria. This study examined mainly the influence of corporate 
governance structure on non-performing loans. This research further assessed the relative impact 
of the policy provided by regulators, the bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomic indica-
tors on non-performing loans. Based on these identified objectives, prior literature relative to 
corporate governance structure, bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomic indicators 
affecting non-performing loans was reviewed and the main theoretical framework underpinning 
this study was the institutional theory of corporate governance.
We posit that the corporate governance structure has a negative influence on the trends of 
nonperforming loans in Nigeria. We also identified that stringent policy imposed by the bank 
regulators has a negative impact on non-performing loans. We found that the bank-specific 
determinant relatively has a conservative influence on non-performing loans. We also identified 
that the staggering economic conditions impair the loan quality. That is, the macroeconomic 
indicator has a positive impact on non-performing loans.
6. Recommendations
From the empirical findings of this study, the following recommendations are stipulated:
(i) There is a necessity for banks to continue implement high-quality corporate governance 
mechanism, which is likely to eliminate excessive risk taking.
(ii) The banking industry should relax their credit policies. It is identified in the course of this 
research that majority of the banks tend to release loans to large firms e.g., oil and gas 
companies that are exposed to high price risk that is high crude oil price volatility. Thus, 
banks should extend their credit provision to small and medium firms that could easily 
navigate through risk exposure compared to larger companies.
(iii) Given that increased inflation rate and lending rate could directly contribute to growth in the 
non-performing loans, the Central Bank of Nigeria tends to face ambiguous results relating to 
non-performing loans when navigating for economic growth. Hence, Central Bank of Nigeria 
should implement expansionary monetary policy to sustenance quick economic recovery.
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